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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NOS. 44588 & 44589
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) KOOTENAI COUNTY NOS.
) CR 2014-12774 & CR 2015-12500
v. )
)
SONNY DEAN FARROW, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sonny Farrow contends the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction in these two cases.  Rather, a sufficient consideration of all the relevant factors in
these cases, which led the rider staff and even the prosecutor to recommend probation, reveals
that suspended sentences would more effectively address all the goals of sentencing.  As such,
this Court should reverse the orders relinquishing jurisdiction and remand these cases for orders
placing Mr. Farrow on probation.
2Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In  the  2014  case,  Mr.  Farrow  pled  guilty  to  domestic  battery  and  the  district  court
imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp.62-63.)1  This event occurred while he was trying to get his life back in order not long
after his pregnant girlfriend was killed in a car accident.  (See Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter,  PSI),  p.11.)   Mr.  Farrow also  had  brain  surgery  in  2005 to  deal  with  an  infection
caused by his addiction to morphine.  (PSI, p.14.)  Since then, he has been working to maintain
his sobriety in that regard, and he has actually been successful in those efforts.  (Compare
PSI, p.14 (indicating that, as of 2014, Mr. Farrow had stopped using morphine, but still struggled
with marijuana use); with PSI, p.54 (2016 rider staff report indicating Mr. Farrow shows “no
dependency” on the Texas Christian University Drug and Alcohol screening).)
Despite struggling some during the rider program and receiving some informal
disciplinary sanctions, Mr. Farrow successfully completed the CRP rider program during that
first  period  of  retained  jurisdiction.   (See PSI, pp.32, 35.)  In fact, the rider staff commended
Mr. Farrow’s efforts in the program, particularly his participation in the mentoring program
toward the end of that period of retained jurisdiction.  (PSI, p.43.)  He “demonstrated a high level
of integrity and showed that he is willing to go above and beyond for his program, his sobriety
and the overall success for his future.”  (PSI, p.43.)  As a result, he was “much more prepared to
handle everyday life and situations upon his release.  He has gained important tools and skills for
continued success and has spent many weeks practicing these skills and putting them into
1 Two copies of the Clerk’s Record, which were organized differently, were provided in this
case.   Citations  in  this  brief  will  refer  to  the  volume  provided  in  the  PDF  document  titled
“FARROW, Sonny_SC #44588 & #44589.”
3practice.”   (PSI, p.43.)  As a result of his success in the rider program, the district court suspend
his sentence for a two-year term of probation.  (R., pp.67-72.)
However, implementing those tools in real-world scenarios proved more difficult than
demonstrating them in practice scenarios, and a few months after Mr. Farrow’s release, the State
filed a motion for probation violation based on the fact that Mr. Farrow had received a new
charge for domestic battery (the 2015 case).  (See R., pp.78-79, 194-95.)  Pursuant to a binding
plea agreement, Mr. Farrow pled guilty to that new domestic battery charge and admitted the
corresponding allegation of probation violation, and the district court imposed a new,
consecutive sentence of three years, with one year fixed, and retained jurisdiction in both cases.
(R., pp.103-05, 232, 233-35.)  Although the district court recommended Mr. Farrow participate
in the CRP rider program again, it was apparently IDOC policy to not allow repeat participation
in  that  program.   (See Tr., Vol.1, p.44, Ls.9-17.)2  As a result, he participated in the general
extended rider program instead.  (See R., pp.236-37.)
As before, Mr. Farrow was able to complete all his assigned programs and received no
formal  disciplinary  reports  during  the  rider  program,  though,  as  before,  he  did  receive  several
informal sanctions.  (PSI, p.54.)  The rider staff ultimately recommended the district court
suspend Mr. Farrow’s sentences for another term of probation because he learned new skills to
help change his thinking and association patterns, thus demonstrating “a solid understanding of
what his responsibilities will entail in order for him to continue to build his foundation for
recovery.”  (PSI, p.58.)
2 The transcripts in this case were provided in two independently bound and paginated volumes.
To avoid confusion, the volume containing the transcript of the November 19, 2015, entry of
plea and sentencing/disposition hearing will be referred to as “Vol.1.”  “Vol.2” will refer to the
volume containing the transcript of the July 26, 2016, rider review hearing.
4However, on his final night at the rider facility, Mr. Farrow was “hazed” out of the
program by some of the other inmates, meaning that some other inmates attacked him.
(PSI, p.64.)  Mr. Farrow was reluctant to participate in the investigation into that incident, but
ultimately, did provide some relevant information.  (PSI, p.64; Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.14-25.)
Nevertheless, the rider staff expressed some concern about Mr. Farrow’s ability to be successful
on probation in light of his reluctance to cooperate with that investigation.  (PSI, pp.64-65.)
However, defense counsel represented at the ensuing rider review hearing that he had a
conversation with the author of that subsequent report, and she had indicated the rider staff was
not changing their  recommendation for probation.   (Tr.,  Vol.2,  p.9,  Ls.2-8; see also Tr., Vol.2,
p.13, Ls.16-17 (the district court accepting defense counsel’s representation of that
conversation).)  The prosecutor also continued to recommend the district court suspend
Mr.  Farrow’s  sentences  despite  those  disciplinary  issues.   (Tr.,  Vol.2,  p.4,  L.18  -  p.5,  L.3.)
Defense counsel joined those recommendations for probation.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, Ls.17-22.)  In
addition, Mr. Farrow took the opportunity to directly apologize to the victim in the 2015 case,
who had written a letter expressing some concern if Mr. Farrow were to be released on
probation,  for  his  actions  and  sought  to  allay  her  concerns.   (See Tr., p.10, Ls.11-15;
Exhibits, p.4.)
Nevertheless, the district court, focusing primarily on the disciplinary issues, decided to
relinquish  jurisdiction  in  both  cases.   (Tr.,  p.11,  L.7  -  p.15,  L.9.)   Mr.  Farrow filed  notices  of
appeal in both case timely from the orders relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.112-16, 240-45.)
5ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction in these cases.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction In These Cases
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001); State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,
438 (Ct. App. 2011).  Such a decision will not be considered an abuse of discretion “if the trial
court has sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate.” State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998); see also State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 600 (1989) (articulating the standard for reviewing discretionary decisions on appeal).
 “The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial
court additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation potential and suitability for
probation.” State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990).  In making that determination, the
district court “considers all of the circumstances to assess the defendant’s ability to succeed in a
less structured environment and to determine the course of action that will further the purposes
of rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and retribution.” Statton, 136 Idaho at 137.  It
is guided in this determination by I.C. § 19-2521. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648.  In this regard, the
need to protect society is the primary objective the court should consider. See, e.g.,
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also
held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration” in making sentencing
decisions. State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in
State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
6In this case, everyone – the prosecutor, the rider staff, and the defense – agreed that
Mr. Farrow’s performance during the most recent period of retained jurisdiction demonstrated an
ability to be successful on probation.  (See PSI, p.58; Tr., Vol.2, p.9, Ls.2-8, p.4, Ls.18-20, p.9,
Ls.17-22.)  They all made that recommendation while acknowledging the disciplinary issues
which arose during the period of retained jurisdiction.  (Compare Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.15, L.9 (the
district court focusing almost exclusively on those incidents as justification for relinquishing
jurisdiction).)   It  is  true  that  Mr.  Farrow  struggled  some  in  the  rider  program,  but  it  is  still
noteworthy that he did not have any formal disciplinary reports during his time in that program.
(See PSI,  p.54.)   And,  as  the  rider  staff  pointed  out,  he  was  able  to  learn  new  skills  to  help
change his thinking and association patterns, and demonstrate “a solid understanding of what his
responsibilities will entail in order for him to continue to build his foundation for recovery.”
(PSI, p.58.)
Similarly,  the  incident  at  the  end  of  his  rider,  does  not  indicate  Mr.  Farrow  would  be
unable to be successful on probation.  As the report indicates, Mr. Farrow was “hazed” out of the
rider  program  by  other  inmates;  he  was  not  the  instigator.   (PSI,  p.64.)   His  reluctance  to
cooperate with the investigation into that incident, particularly given that he ultimately did
provide some relevant information, does not negate the progress he made in the program or his
potential for continued rehabilitation while on probation.  (See Tr., Vol.2, p.8, L.14 - p.9, L.4.)
Rather, his progress in that program despite his struggles, reaffirms what the rest of the
record demonstrates – Mr. Farrow does have the ability to be successful in his rehabilitative
efforts while on probation.   Most notably,  he has successfully dealt  with his drug addictions to
the point where he shows “no dependency” on drug and alcohol screenings.  (See PSI,
pp.14, 54.)  He also completed all the assigned programs during his period of retained
7jurisdiction, and showed good growth during those programs.  (See PSI, pp.54, 58.)  As such, a
sufficient consideration of all the relevant information in the record, not just the disciplinary
information upon which the district  court  focused, reveals that  Mr. Farrow has the potential  to
continue rehabilitating effectively on probation, and suspending his sentences would still serve
all  the other goals of sentencing.  As such, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction represents an
abuse of the district court’s discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Farrow respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order relinquishing
jurisdiction and remand these cases for orders placing him on probation.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2017.
_______/S/__________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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